May the Best Merchandise Win:  The Law of Non-Trademark Uses of Sports Logos by Kahn, Mark A.
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 2 Spring Article 3
May the Best Merchandise Win: The Law of Non-
Trademark Uses of Sports Logos
Mark A. Kahn
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment and Sports Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Mark A. Kahn, May the Best Merchandise Win: The Law of Non-Trademark Uses of Sports Logos, 14 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 283 (2004)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol14/iss2/3
ARTICLES
MAY THE BEST MERCHANDISE WIN: THE
LAW OF NON-TRADEMARK USES OF
SPORTS LOGOS
MARK A. KAHN 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose you are planning to go to a Major League Baseball game during
the upcoming weekend. To prepare for your outing, you go down to your
local mom-and-pop sporting goods retailer to purchase a shirt featuring the
logo of your favorite baseball team. At the store, you see several different
styles of shirts ranging from an eight-dollar shirt that feels like it will fall apart
the first time it is washed to a twenty-dollar 100%-cotton tee shirt. You may
or may not consider whether either your favorite team or Major League
Baseball "officially" sponsors any or all of the shirts, but you probably do not
care. Rather, your primary interest is in obtaining a piece of quality
merchandise that will allow you to express your loyalties at the ballpark.
After weighing the options, you settle on the top-of-the-line twenty-dollar
shirt. Unbeknownst to you (or even the owners of the store), the shirt you
chose is not officially licensed by Major League Baseball. In fact, it is part of
a series of professional sports team shirts produced by an unlicensed, third-
party vendor. This vendor operates his business by purchasing plain, white
shirts from a clothing wholesaler and then has various designs and logos
pressed onto the shirts. As it happens, the shirts used by this vendor are
identical in fabric blend and quality to the shirts used by vendors that are
officially licensed by Major League Baseball. In fact, the only difference
between the shirts is that an unlicensed vendor produces one set and a licensed
vendor produces the other.
If you asked a layperson (or even most attorneys) what was wrong with
the third-party vendor's behavior in the above hypothetical, you would likely
be instructed that the third-party vendor was infringing the trademark of the
Major League Baseball team. However, the behavior of the third-party vendor
1. The author is a litigator at Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnell & Phillips, a law firm located in San
Francisco. He holds a J.D. from the University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall) and a B.S. in
Computer Science from Stanford University. Between college and law school, Mr. Kahn worked in
the front office of a Major League Baseball team.
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does not constitute infringement under traditional federal trademark law.
While the apparent equities of such a hypothetical may compel some courts to
find that the team's trademark has been infringed, the principles of trademark
law do not support such holdings.
II. BACKGROUND LAW
Although the Lanham Act, the current federal statute governing trademark
law, was originally signed into law only in the first half of the twentieth
century,2 legal protection for trademarks has existed for several centuries. 3
The Lanham Act did not represent a significant change in trademark law;
rather, it merely codified many of the common law trademark protections that
had developed over the previous four centuries. 4
A. Underlying Theory of Trademark Law: The Lanham Act as a Consumer-
Protection Statute
Two significant interests are advanced by the Lanham Act: (1) the
interests of the consumer in knowing that a given product comes from a
known producer, and (2) the interests of the manufacturer in being permitted
to develop and control the goodwill associated with a given product.5 While
these two sets of interests are not mutually exclusive, trademark law is a
consumer protection law,6 and as such, the interests of manufacturers are
irrelevant except to the extent that consumer interests are affected.7
2. The Lanham Act was originally passed in 1946. Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §
1051(2000). However, the first federal trademark statute was enacted in 1870. See 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:3 (4th ed. 1999).
3. See BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 2 (4th ed.
2001) (citing a 16 th Century English case as the first reported trademark case).
4. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:5.
5. See Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
6. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989).
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the common-law tort of deceit: its general concern is with
protecting consumers from confusion as to source. While that concern may result in the creation of
'quasi-property rights' in communicative symbols, the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the
protection of producers as an incentive to product innovation.
Id; see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:33 ("[W]hile the consumer is not a directly participating
litigant, the consumer's state of mind is paramount. In this sense, protection of trademarks is merely
a facet of consumer protection.").
7. In a 1999 article, Professor Mark Lemley explores how courts have moved away from the
consumer protection rationale of trademark law and have recognized a property interest in
trademarks. Professor Lemley argues that proper application of trademark law does not recognize
such a property interest. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999).
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Trademark law's focus on the consumer stems from the way that a
trademark functions. A trademark permits a consumer to know something
about the quality of a given product without investing time and money
researching the specifics of the product. 8 Thus, trademarks reduce transaction
costs. Because the trademark owner is known to produce goods of a certain
quality, consumers can assume that future goods will be of a similar quality.
The consumer focus of trademarks is manifested in the definition of the
term under the Lanham Act. Under the Act, a trademark is defined as follows:
The term "trademark" includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or
any combination thereof -
(I) used by a person, or
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce
and applies to register on the principal register established by this
[Act],
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique
product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown. 9
Under this definition, the mark only functions as a trademark to the extent that
the mark serves as a source identifier to consumers. As a result, when marks
are not functioning as trademarks, the Lanham Act does not protect their use.
Two decades before the Lanham Act was passed, the Harvard Law Review
published Frank Schechter's now seminal piece on trademark law entitled The
Rational Basis of Trademark Protection.10 In this oft-cited work, Schechter
provides a thorough discussion of how trademarks function in commercial
society." Specifically, he notes,
[The trademark] indicates, not that the article in question comes from
a definite or particular source, the characteristics of which or the
personalities connected with which are specifically known to the
consumer, but merely that the goods in connection with which it is
used emanate from the same - possibly anonymous - source or have
reached the consumer through the same channels as certain other
goods that have already given the consumer satisfaction, and that bore
8. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
529 (3rd ed. 2003).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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the same trademark.12
Schechter goes on to remark that "[t]he true functions of the trademark
are, then, to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further
purchases by the consuming public."1 3
Two years after the Lanham Act was passed, Professor Ralph Brown
published an important article regarding the economics of trademarks as they
relate to advertising. 14 In the piece, Professor Brown recognizes that "[t]he
informative job of trade symbols is conventionally considered to be
identification of source; and it is this capacity which courts traditionally have
protected." 15 Consequently, from the earliest days of the current statutory
framework of trademark law in the United States, legal scholars have focused
on how trademark law is designed to protect and assist consumers, rather than
on how businesses benefit from trademark law.
The purpose of the Lanham Act, as embodied in 15 U.S.C. § 1127, reflects
this overriding concern for the consumer:
The intent of this [act] is to regulate commerce within the control of
Congress by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of
marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used in such
commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to
protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition;
to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce by the use of
reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of
registered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by
treaties and conventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and
unfair competition entered into between the United States and foreign
nations. 16
Although nothing in the expressed intent of the Lanham Act limits
trademark causes of action to situations where consumers are confused,
resulting in misappropriation of goodwill, this subsection focuses on deceptive
and misleading practices, which necessarily focuses the inquiry on the minds
of consumers and the public in general. Consequently, the implication of this
subsection of the Lanham Act is that consumer confusion must be present in
order for the Lanham Act to apply.
12. Id. at 816.
13. Id. at 818.
14. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols,
57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948).
15. Id. at 1185.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
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Admittedly, "intent" sections of statutes do not necessarily reveal the true
congressional purpose that underlies a given law. However, the legislative
history of the Lanham Act further supports the claim that Congress hoped to
protect consumers against deception:
[W]hen it is considered that the protection of trade-marks [sic] is
merely protection to goodwill, to prevent diversion of trade through
misrepresentation, and the protection of the public against deception, a
sound public policy requires that trade-marks [sic] should receive
nationally the greatest protection that can be given to them. 17
The legislative history thus reflects a desire to prevent misappropriation of
goodwill in the context of preventing harm to consumers.
The legislative history further indicates that there is not a property
ownership of a trademark except to the extent that the unauthorized use of a
trademark results in deception. 18 "[T]he fundamental principles of trademark
law have essentially been ones of tort: unfair competition, and the tort of
deception of the consumer. In this sense, trademarks may not be thought of as
analogous to 'property rights' at all."' 19 As a result, trademark law is not
concerned with misappropriation in monetary terms per se. Rather, trademark
law only cares about loss of revenue to the trademark owner to the extent that
the trademark owner has also wrongly had its goodwill misappropriated.
It is plausible to argue that the Lanham Act essentially constitutes a
federal law of unfair competition. However, while an acknowledged goal of
the Lanham Act is to stop unfair competition, the Lanham Act does not create
a general federal law of unfair competition. 20 In fact, trademark law is merely
a small subset of the law of unfair competition. 21
As a result, trademark law cannot serve as a vehicle to stop all types of
unjust business practices. While unfair competition deals with all practices
relating to the purchase of goods, trademark law focuses just on practices that
hinder the source-identifying function of the mark that appears on the
17. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 4 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277.
18. "It is only where the unauthorized use of a trade-mark [sic] results in deception with
consequent damage to the so-called owner, in other words, amounts to unfair competition, that there
is an invasion of the 'owner's' right." Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. on Trademarks
of the House Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong. 57 (1938) (statement of Rep. Lanham, Member, House
Subcomm. on Trademarks), quoted in 8 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
pt. 111-32, § 1114 (1999).
19. MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 531.
20. See Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1971); Glenn v.
Adver. Publ'ns, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
21. See PATTISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-4.
2004]
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underlying goods.22 For example, if a manufacturer's competitor were to go
to a retail store and hide all of that manufacturer's goods, that would probably
constitute unfair competition but not trademark infringement. To the extent
that the Lanham Act prohibits unfair competition, that prohibition is most
prevalent in § 43(a). 23 According to one court, "Congress' purpose in
enacting § 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair competition
remedy.... .-24 Importantly, because of the construction of the section, the
statute only covers unfair competition to the extent that false description (i.e.,
false advertising) or false designation of origin is involved.25 Moreover, the
court in Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks interpreted § 43(a) as follows:
In effect it says: you may not conduct your business in a way that
unnecessarily or unfairly interferes with and injures that of another;
you may not destroy the basis of genuine competition by destroying
the buyer's opportunity to judge fairly between rival commodities by
introducing such factors as falsely descriptive trade-marks [sic] which
are capable of misinforming as to the true qualities of the competitive
products. 26
Thus, while the Lanham Act, and more specifically, § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, seeks to prevent unfair competition, it is only a small subset of unfair
competition that falls within the ambit of the Lanham Act.
Given the limited nature of trademark law as a prohibition against unfair
competition, it is worth considering what constitutes misappropriation of
goodwill. Goodwill is not easily defined, but one court summed it up as "the
favorable consideration shown by the purchasing public to goods known to
emanate from a particular source." 27 Moreover, as McCarthy explains, "A
trademark is a very peculiar kind of property. For it has no existence apart
from the good will of the product or service it symbolizes. Good will of a
business and its symbol, a trademark, are inseparable." 28
Thus, the trademark itself does not have good will; rather, the goodwill of
the trademark is wrapped up with the goodwill of the underlying products. A
trademark owner creates goodwill in his mark with respect to his products by
repeatedly attaching his mark to products of a certain quality level. Thus, an
22. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:7.
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
24. Colligan, 442 F.2d at 692.
25. See id. at 692-93.
26. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955).
27. White Tower Sys., Inc. v. White Castle Sys. of Eating Houses Corp., 90 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir.
1937).
28. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 2:15.
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infringer misappropriates the goodwill of the trademark owner when the
infringer attaches a "counterfeit" mark to his own goods and attempts to sell
his products based on that goodwill that the trademark owner has built up over
the years.
B. Manifestations of the Consumer-Protection Theory: Trademark Disputes
Under the Lanham Act and the Common Law
Given the consumer-protection focus of trademark law, it is worth
discussing the specifics of how trademarks are protected under federal law.
The section begins with a discussion of standing under the Lanham Act. A
discussion of traditional trademark infringement and infringement by dilution
follows. The section concludes with a discussion of the various defenses to
trademark infringement that may be applicable to sports logo scenarios.
1. The "Standing" Anomaly
An interesting characteristic of trademark law is that although the key
component of a trademark law cause of action is consumer confusion,
consumers do not have standing to sue.29 Instead, only the trademark owner is
authorized to institute a cause of action.30 Arguably, this suggests that
because standing to sue resides solely with trademark owners, the key to any
trademark law inquiry is whether there has been misappropriation rather than
whether there has been consumer confusion. However, for several reasons,
this argument oversimplifies the reason why consumers lack standing, and the
focus of any trademark infringement action continues to be on the likelihood
of consumer confusion.
First, although trademark law requires that consumers be confused, the
trademark owners incur a much greater amount of harm. Specifically, while
the individual consumer suffers because he does not get the product that he
thought he was getting, the trademark owner suffers in two ways: (1) the
revenue that she was entitled to is diverted to the counterfeit manufacturer, and
(2) the goodwill she has invested time and money in developing deteriorates,
assuming that the counterfeit goods are of a lesser quality.
Second, the trademark owners are the ones that are intimately familiar
with their trademarks. Thus, they are more likely than the average consumer
to know that their trademarks have been infringed. Even if consumers were
aware that they had bought counterfeit goods, letting consumers sue would be
29. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 27:20.
30. See id
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extremely inefficient for two reasons: (1) there would be the potential for
duplicative lawsuits in many jurisdictions, and (2) a potential plaintiff would
have to learn a great deal from both the trademark owner and the counterfeit
manufacturer before instigating a lawsuit. Ultimately, requiring a consumer to
sue probably would have the effect of merely forcing trademark owners to find
an aggrieved consumer to be the plaintiff in a trademark suit against a
counterfeit manufacturer.
Third, because trademark owners suffer so much more, they are much
more likely to bring suit for trademark infringement than an affected consumer
would be if consumers were authorized to do so. Certainly, if a consumer
bought a BMW car that turned out to be a counterfeit, he would probably go to
great lengths to get his money back. In those circumstances, giving consumers
the sole right to sue would probably be sufficient to curtail counterfeiting.
However, if a consumer bought a Duncan Yo-Yo that turned out to be
counterfeit, the consumer probably would not sue.
Finally, even though consumers do not have standing to sue under
trademark law, they might be able to sustain a cause of action under state law
fraud statutes. Thus, it is unnecessary to have trademark law be the body of
law under which consumers seek redress from counterfeit manufacturers. In
contrast, some sort of trademark law probably is necessary in order for
aggrieved trademark owners to have a plausible mechanism of recourse.
2. Infringement
a. Traditional Trademark Infringement
Trademark infringement analysis focuses on the likelihood of consumer
confusion. Specifically, if the defendant's conduct is likely to cause confusion
in the minds of consumers with respect to the source of the product, a court
may find that the defendant has infringed the plaintiffs trademark.
Two sections of the Lanham Act codify the likelihood of confusion
requirement with respect to the situation described in the above hypothetical.
First, § 32 states that a defendant will be liable for trademark infringement if
the defendant uses a mark in connection with the sale of goods or services that
is likely to cause confusion with the plaintiff's registered trademark. 31 When a
31. The section specifically states that:
(1) Any person who shall without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
[Vol. 14:2
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plaintiff alleges that a defendant has infringed the plaintiffs trademark, the
court will evaluate the case under the standards set forth in § 32. Although §
32 does not explicitly define what "confusion" entails, because § 45 defines a
trademark in terms of its source-identifying function, confusion must
necessarily refer to confusion as to the source of the underlying goods.
Second, § 43(a)(1) is also relevant to the likelihood of confusion analysis,
specifically with respect to the subset of protectable trademarks known as
trade dress and product configurations. The subsection provides,
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which - (A) is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.32
Thus, § 43(a)(1) prohibits the infringement of a plaintiffs trademarks,
regardless of whether or not the mark is registered. In addition, this section
explicitly extends protection beyond words or phrases to include what is
known as the trade dress of products.
Although § 32 and § 43 protect different types of trademarks, both
sections focus on the likelihood of consumer confusion. In AMF, Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats,33 the Ninth Circuit outlined the typical test that courts will
apply in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. The factors to
be considered include (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3)
similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing
channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised
mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2000).
33. 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979).
2004]
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by the purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8)
likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 34 While evidence of actual
confusion can certainly strengthen a plaintiffs position, it is not required for
the plaintiff to prevail. 35
The underlying theory of trademark law36 requires that the likelihood of
confusion analysis be the focus of a trademark infringement suit where related
goods are involved. In contrast, if the defendant is selling goods that are
unrelated and dissimilar to the plaintiff's goods, likelihood of confusion can be
much harder to prove because the plaintiff has to demonstrate that consumers
are likely to assume that the plaintiff has started producing goods in an
industry that is completely unrelated to the plaintiffs previously produced
goods. In those situations, the plaintiff may have to rely on a dilution theory
to prove trademark infringement. 37 However, if the goods produced by the
defendant "compete for sales with those of the trademark owner, infringement
usually will be found if the marks are sufficiently similar that confusion can be
expected. ' 38 Consequently, in situations where the defendant has used the
plaintiffs exact trademark to sell goods that are similar to goods that the
plaintiff is selling, a court can probably infer a sufficient likelihood of
confusion to hold that the defendant is infringing the plaintiff's mark.39
Notably, if a mark on a product does not indicate that the product is
coming from a particular source, the mark is not functioning as a trademark.40
For example, if a newspaper prints a story and includes a third-party
company's trademark in a graphic that accompanies the story, the third-party
company's trademark is not functioning as a trademark. That is, the inclusion
of the trademark does not cause consumers to believe that the company
sponsors the newspaper or is the source of the newspaper. In contrast, if the
newspaper substituted the logo of a competing newspaper on its banner, the
competing logo would be functioning as a trademark, and the competing
newspaper probably would succeed in a trademark infringement suit.
However, a company's trademark can perform its trademark functions
even if consumers do not know the identity of the source of the underlying
34. See id. at 348-49.
35. See Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 928 (10th Cir. 1986).
36. See Part ILA, supra.
37. For a discussion of dilution, see Part II.B.2.b, infra.
38. AMF, 599 F.2d at 348.
39. In general, that includes the scenario outlined in the above hypothetical, but only to the extent
that the sports logos are performing source-identifying functions.
40. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3:1.
[Vol. 14:2
PA TCHING OVER A PERCEIVED HOLE...
product.4 1 For example, consumers who see Ritz Crackers do not necessarily
know that Nabisco produces Ritz Crackers. However, the Ritz Crackers logo
is still performing a source-identifying function because consumers know that
the logo means that the crackers come from a single source and can expect a
certain quality level when the logo appears on a product. Thus, a mark
functions as a trademark if the consumer knows that the underlying product
comes from a single source, even if the consumer cannot identify specifically
who the source is.
b. Infringement by Dilution
Unlike infringement under a likelihood of confusion theory, infringement
under a dilution theory is an extremely recent development of federal
trademark law.42 Under dilution, a plaintiff can sustain a cause of action
against a defendant for trademark infringement, even if there is no likelihood
of confusion as to source.43 The statute defines "dilution" to mean "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of - (1) competition between
the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception." 44 Thus, dilution is premised on the theory that the
holder of a famous mark could be damaged if another person used the same or
similar mark to sell completely unrelated goods or services. Notably, although
dilution is a recent addition to the federal statute, it has existed at common law
and in various state statutes for many years after being first outlined in
Schechter's article in 1927.4 5
The dilution theory of trademark infringement is controversial because it
seems to push trademark law more towards a property rights based theory.46
Although the ostensible reason for permitting a dilution claim is that the
41. This is known as the single-source rule. The premise is that consumers know that the given
trademark is an assurance of a certain quality level, but consumers do not know who is ultimately
responsible for ensuring that quality level. Numerous examples of such trademarks exist in modem
society. For example, consumers who use 1-800-COLLECT to make collect phone calls do so
because they perceive that they will save money. However, most consumers (at least when the phone
number debuted) probably are not aware that MCI owns and operates the 1-800-COLLECT service.
For a further discussion of the single-source rule, see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 3:9.
42. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 amended § 43 to add a trademark cause of
action based on dilution. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)).
43. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1029 (2d Cir.
1989); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, at § 24:70.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
45. See Schechter, supra note 10.
46. However, a full discussion of the merits of dilution is well beyond the scope of this article.
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plaintiffs trademark could lose its distinctiveness and thus its source-
identifying ability, dilution does not require a likelihood of confusion, and
thus, ignores the consumer state of mind that is the focus of traditional
trademark law.
While infringement based on a likelihood of confusion can be alleged by
any holder of a valid trademark, dilution is only available to holders of truly
famous marks,47 though what constitutes a famous mark depends on the given
court's interpretation of the statute. While the statute does not provide a
definition of the term "famous mark," it suggests several criteria to consider.48
Logos of professional sports teams probably would be considered famous
under the suggested criteria.49
Infringement via dilution is typically proven under one of two theories: (1)
blurring, and (2) tarnishment. Under the blurring theory, the plaintiffs
trademark loses some of its distinctiveness because of the defendant's use of
the same or similar mark.50 Unlike with the likelihood of confusion analysis,
for a court to find for a plaintiff under dilution theory, the defendant and
plaintiff can operate in completely different fields with no overlap of
products. 51 For example, if someone were to produce Kodak bicycles, the
Kodak film company would probably be able to raise a trademark
infringement claim based on a dilution theory.52
Under the tarnishment theory, the plaintiffs goodwill is harmed because
the defendant's conduct creates a link in the consumer's mind between the
plaintiffs mark and goods of unsavory or shoddy quality.53 Again, there is no
requirement that the defendant and plaintiff operate in related fields or
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
48. The non-exhaustive list of criteria includes:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the duration and extent of use of
the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and
extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which
the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; (F) the
degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and
the person against whom the injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). With respect to the last criterion, from the legislative history, it is
clear that a mark can be famous without being registered. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 647.
49. In fact, assuming that the professional sports teams have registered their marks, all of the
factors in the non-exhaustive list weigh heavily in favor of a finding of famousness.
50. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 24:68.
51. See Mead Data, 875 F.2dat 1031.
52. See Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 [British] R.P.C. 105 (1898).
53. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39,43 (2d Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 14:2
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manufacture related products.54 For example, returning to Kodak, a court
enjoined a stand-up comedian from using "Kodak" as his stage name because
the comedian's crude jokes impaired Kodak's reputation and thus constituted
tarnishment. 55
3. Defenses
An accused infringer has numerous defenses that it may invoke.56 For
instance, if the plaintiff has failed to adequately police the use of its trademark,
the defendant may claim that the plaintiff has abandoned its trademark.57 A
court may find that a defendant has abandoned its trademark even if the
defendant registered the trademark with the Patent and Trademark Office.
In the context of licensing arrangements, a court may deem that a plaintiff
has abandoned its trademark if it fails to exercise a sufficient level of control
over the licensee. 58 The Lanham Act provides that supervised licensing is
permissible and will not render a trademark abandoned while "naked
licensing" will constitute abandonment. 59 As long as a trademark owner
exerts some control over the use of his trademark in these licensing
agreements, a court probably would find that the mark has not been
abandoned.6°
Trademarks that involve product designs or configurations fall under the
subset of trademark law known as trade dress. 61 Trade dress law recognizes a
unique defense known as functionality. 62 Under the doctrine, a trademark
owner cannot obtain trademark protection based on the functional aspects of
54. See id
55. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
56. Abandonment, fair use, and functionality are described in detail here. Accused infringers
have successfully invoked other defenses including laches, estoppel, parody, genericide, and unclean
hands. Defendants have also succeeded by alleging antitrust violations on the part of the trademark
owner. For a thorough discussion of these defenses, see PATIISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, at 105-31,
242-71.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
58. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959).
59. See id at 367; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (2000).
60. It is relatively easy to escape this section of the Lanham Act. For a discussion of what
constitutes a naked license agreement, see First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19426, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 1990). Consequently, sports team logo owners have
probably not abandoned their marks by virtue of their licensing arrangements.
61. For a primer on trade dress law, see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 7:54.
62. For an extensive summary of the uneven application of the doctrines of functionality and
aesthetic functionality under federal trademark law, see Colleen R. Courtade, Application of
Functionality Doctrine Under § 43(a) ofLanham Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a)), 78 A.L.R. Fed. 712.
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the trademark.63 Functional aspects are those features of the trade dress that
are necessary for another company to compete with the trademark owner.64
For instance, in Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc.,65 the court outlined the
test for whether a feature is functional. 66 Specifically, the court explained that
just because a feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of
the product does not render the feature functional. 67 Rather, the feature must
be essential to the purpose of the product to be considered functional. 68 Thus,
in Stormy Clime, although the Second Circuit remanded the case on the issue
of functionality, the question was whether shingles and vents, high-sheen
material, and a hood were functional features of a rain jacket.69 Consequently,
on remand, the district court needed to consider whether each of these features
was essential to the purpose of the rain jacket.
The underlying theory of the functionality defense is that a trademark
holder should not be granted protection for features that could receive
protection under other areas of intellectual property law, specifically patent
law. 70 If a trademark owner could gain protection under trademark laws for
functional features, the trademark owner would be usurping the patent laws to
obtain a monopoly with no temporal restrictions. Under patent law, inventions
fall into the public domain after twenty years at most. 71 Thus, without the
functionality defense, functional features of a trademark potentially would
never fall into the public domain and society would be denied the benefits that
the patent laws are designed to ensure. 72
Related to the functionality defense to trademark infringement is the much
slipperier defense of aesthetic functionality. 73  Aesthetic functionality
embodies the concept that a feature or design is desirable simply because of its
aesthetic appeal. 74 Such a feature or design is not essential in a functional
way. However, the public purchases the product primarily based on the
aesthetic appeal of that design. For example, courts have determined that
63. See Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987).
64. See id at 976-77.
65. 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987).
66. Id. at 977.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 976.
70. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 7:64.
71. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 114.
72. See generally id. at 690-94.
73. See id. at 677.
74. Id.
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patterns on silverware, 75 luggage fabric patterns,76 and tractor colors 77 are all
aesthetically functional because the features do not make the underlying
products function better, but they would provide a competitive advantage if
one party had a monopoly over the features. Under the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition, "aesthetic functionality" is defined as follows:
A design is functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a
significant benefit that cannot be practically duplicated by the use of
alternative designs. Because of the difficulties inherent in evaluating
the aesthetic superiority of a particular design, a finding of aesthetic
functionality ordinarily will be made only when objective evidence
indicates a lack of adequate alternative designs. Such evidence
typically is available only when the range of [adequate] alternative
designs is limited either by the nature of the design feature or by the
basis of its aesthetic appeal. The ultimate test of aesthetic
functionality, as with utilitarian functionality [designs], is whether the
recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder
competition. 78
As with the standard functionality defense, the test focuses on the effects
on competition. That is, the question focuses on whether the defendant could
use an alternative design and still compete with the plaintiff for sales.
The underlying rationales for permitting a defense of aesthetic
functionality are controversial. On the one hand, unlike standard functionality,
features that are considered aesthetically functional probably cannot receive
patent protection, and as such, plaintiffs have no other mechanism to protect
their creative designs other than through trademark law. On the other hand,
there is no compelling reason to let trademark owners have a monopoly over
some design feature that adds nothing of value to the product.
Although the merits of aesthetic functionality are debatable, the defense
remains viable for accused infringers. Because purchasers of team
merchandise probably would strongly prefer the actual logo of their favorite
team to appear on the merchandise rather than merely the team name or some
unauthorized logo, such official logos properly fit under the definition of
aesthetically functional features.
75. See Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
76. See Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
77. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995).
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1II. DISCUSSION
A. Applying Trademark Law to Counterfeit Logo Manufacturers
1. Prohibition on Counterfeiting Under the Consumer-Protection Theory of
Trademark Law
For a given trademark to function properly, the trademark holder must
take efforts to keep the trademark from being counterfeited. Early trademark
law cases "reflect[ed] an awareness of the need to provide a legal remedy
against counterfeiting." 79 In most counterfeiting situations, the defendant has
attempted to "palm off' his products as that of the rightful trademark owner.
A manufacturer is liable for palming off a trademark owner's legitimate
trademark when the palming off results in consumer confusion. 80 Thus, the
counterfeit manufacturer attempts to trade on the goodwill that consumers
have come to associate with the trademark.
However, the desire to prevent counterfeiting does not stem from concern
for the moneymaking abilities of the trademark owner. Rather, trademark law
has always sought to prevent counterfeiting because of the effect on
consumers. 81 Specifically, if a counterfeiter makes a poor quality product and
attaches to his product a trademark that signifies high quality, consumers will
purchase the "counterfeit goods" on the basis of the trademark. Eventually,
the goodwill associated with that trademark will deteriorate. As a result,
consumers will not be able to rely on the trademark to provide information
concerning the quality of a product. Consequently, if counterfeiting were not
prohibited, the primary function of trademarks would be significantly
hampered.
Notably, trademarks do not provide perfect information. For instance, a
company that has produced high quality goods for many generations may
suddenly begin to produce low quality goods. The drop-off in quality may
result from any number of events, including a change in ownership, a switch in
manufacturing processes, or the implementation of cost-cutting mechanisms.
Initially, consumers purchase goods with the trademark because the trademark
has traditionally indicated that the associated goods are of high quality.
However, if future goods do not live up to that quality level, the trademark
owner's goodwill rightly deteriorates, and consumers assume that future goods
79. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 529.
80. See Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 961 (7th Cir. 1992).
81. See Part ILA, supra.
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will be of a similar lesser quality. Eventually, consumer perception of quality
and actual quality correlate, at least until the next shift in quality.
Critics of the consumer confusion requirement of trademark law might
argue that the imperfect information provided by trademarks implies that a
cause of action against counterfeiters should not require a showing of a
likelihood of consumer confusion. In other words, these critics would claim
that consumers would not necessarily have an accurate perception of the
quality associated with a given trademark because of the imperfect nature of
the information provided by trademarks. However, this criticism is
unpersuasive for two reasons: (1) the information is imperfect only for short
periods of time following relatively infrequent changes in the quality level of
the underlying goods; and (2) the existence of a disparity between consumer
perceptions and actual quality levels could be for legitimate reasons, and
therefore, does not obviate the need for trademark owners to show a likelihood
of consumer confusion.
2. The Boston Professional Hockey Decision
In Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Manufacturing, Inc.,82 the Fifth Circuit considered the precise question of
whether a sports team can claim trademark protection on merchandise that
features the logo of the sports team.83 In Boston Professional Hockey, the
National Hockey League (NHL) and thirteen teams brought suit against Dallas
Cap & Emblem Manufacturing, Inc. after the defendant sold emblems
representing the various teams to sporting goods stores without authorization
from the league or any of the teams.84 Notably, prior to selling the emblems,
the defendant attempted to enter into a license agreement with the NHL to be
an authorized distributor of such emblems. 85 However, the negotiations were
unsuccessful, and the defendant proceeded to sell the emblems without
authorization. 86
While the district court found for the league and the teams under an unfair
competition claim, the court denied the Lanham Act federal trademark
82. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975)
83. Notably, other courts have considered this issue. However, Boston Professional Hockey was
the first decision of record on this issue, and other courts have tended to analyze the issue similarly.
For further details on other related cases, see Avi Friedman, Protection of Sports Trademarks, 15
Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 689 (1995).
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infringement claim. 87 Moreover, the court granted only injunctive relief as it
refused the plaintiffs' requests for damages. 88 Consequently, the league and
the teams appealed. 89
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the defendant was
liable under an infringement claim (15 U.S.C. § 1114)90 and a false
designation of origin claim (15 U.S.C. § 1125). 91 Additionally, the court
affirmed the district court's finding for the plaintiffs on the unfair competition
claim.92  In finding for the plaintiffs, the court noted three underlying
justifications for its decision:
First, the major commercial value of the emblems is derived from the
efforts of plaintiffs. Second, defendant sought and ostensibly would
have asserted, if obtained, an exclusive right to make and sell the
emblems. Third, the sale of a reproduction of the trademark itself on
an emblem is an accepted use of such team symbols in connection
with the type of activity in which the business of professional sports is
engaged. 93
As to the specifics of the § 1114 claim, the court first outlined the
requirements for a cause of action under the section:
A cause of action for the infringement of a registered mark in
violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 exists where a person uses (1) any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a mark; (2)
without the registrant's consent; (3) in commerce; (4) in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any
goods; (5) where such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake or to deceive. 94
According to the court, the potentially problematic elements are the fourth
and fifth ones. As to the fourth element, the court found that selling the
trademark itself satisfied that element. 95 In terms of the fifth element, the
court focused on the fact that the Lanham Act "was amended to eliminate the
87. See id. at 1008.
88. See id. at 1004.
89. Boston ProflHockey, 510 F.2d at 1012..
90. Id. at 1012-13.
91. Id. at 1013.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1011.
94. Boston Profl Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1009-10.
95. Id. at 1011-12.
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source of origin as being the only focal point of confusion." 96 According to
the court, the likelihood of confusion requirement was satisfied because
potential purchasers of merchandise with the unauthorized emblems would
identify the emblems as being the teams' trademarks. 97 Thus, "[t]he certain
knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols
were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act." 98
With respect to the "false designation of origin" claim, the court noted that
15 U.S.C. § 1125 "is broadly worded and proscribes not only 'a false
designation of origin' but also the use of 'any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or
represent ... goods or services' in commerce." 99 Implicit in the decision is
the court's reading of this section of the Lanham Act to cover not only
trademarks used in the traditional way to identify the source of the product but
also use of marks in other ways that have no relation to the identification of
the source of the product on which the mark appears. In deciding the "false
designation of origin" claim, the court relied on the "likelihood of confusion"
finding under § 1114. Again, because "the consuming public had the certain
knowledge that the source and origin of the trademark symbol was in the...
team, the reproduction of [the team's] symbol by defendant constituted a
violation of § 1125."100
Dallas Cap raised an aesthetic functionality defense, but the Fifth Circuit
court rejected it.10 1 Specifically, the court found the aesthetic functionality
defense inapplicable because the emblems lacked any appealing characteristics
96. Id. at 1012. The court provides no support for this contention. Although 15 U.S.C. § 1114
was amended in 1962 to remove the phrase "as to the source of origin of such goods or services," it
was done for two reasons: (1) to make it clear that the same test that is used for determining
registrability was to be used for infringement questions; and (2) to recognize that consumers can be
confused even if they do not know who the underlying source is. See Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before
the Subcomm. on Trademarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong. 45 (1938), quoted in
GILSON, supra note 18, at pt. 111-32, § 1114. In Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,
437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971), the Second Circuit explained that the amendment allows causes of
action where the consumer is confused between two products but not as to the source of the products.
This reading of the amendment comports with trademark law's consistent focus on consumers being
able to use a trademark to know something about the underlying product. In contrast, adopting the
Boston Professional Hockey court's analysis would convert trademark law into a full-fledged general
law of unfair competition. However, that is not what the Lanham Act is or should be. See Part ILA,
supra.
97. Boston Profl Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012.
98. Id.
99. Id at 1010.
100. Id. at 1012-13.
101. Id. at 1013.
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other than the trademarks themselves. 1°2 Thus, the court distinguished the
situation here from the situation in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,103 where
the Ninth Circuit rejected an unfair competition claim under the theory that the
designs on chinaware were functional because the aesthetic appeal of the
designs aided in the selling of the china. 10 4 Here, according to the court, the
aesthetic appeal was based on the trademark nature of the sports team logo,
and as such, the defendant could not invoke the functionality defense. 10 5
3. The Boston Professional Hockey Court Misapplied Federal Trademark Law.
The Fifth Circuit erred in two ways in its analysis of the defendant's
conduct in Boston Professional Hockey. First, the court failed to recognize the
rational basis of trademark law as a consumer-protection statute, and thus,
mishandled the likelihood of confusion analysis. Second, the court's analysis
of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality was overly simplistic, and as a
consequence, the court did not give appropriate consideration to the defense.
a. Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
At first glance, the court's likelihood of confusion analysis appears
correct. The facts indicate that the defendant knowingly copied the plaintiffs'
trademarked logos to try to make a profit off of the sale of the logos.
Moreover, the defendant engaged in its actions after failed attempts to
negotiate the right to act in the precise way that it did. However, upon closer
inspection of the defendant's behavior, it is apparent that there is not the
likelihood of confusion as to source as is required for the Lanham Act to
apply. Specifically, the Lanham Act should not apply to situations such as the
one described in Boston Professional Hockey because the counterfeit logo is
not being used to provide consumers with assurance as to the quality of the
underlying products.
To the court's credit, it did realize that the situation in this case was
different than prior trademark infringement suits. Specifically, the court noted
that "[t]he confusion question here is conceptually difficult. It can be said that
the public buyer knew that the emblems portrayed the teams' symbols. Thus,
it can be argued, the buyer is not confused or deceived."' 1 6 Ultimately, the
court rejected this reasoning and held that "[t]he confusion or deceit
102. Boston Profl Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1013.
103. 198 F.2d 339 (9' h Cir. 1952).
104. Boston Prof'l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1013.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1012.
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requirement is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the protected
trademarks and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify
them as being the teams' trademarks."' 10 7
Again, the court's conclusion has some appeal. If a customer walked into
a sporting goods store, as in the hypothetical presented in the Introduction, a
customer who saw merchandise that featured the defendant's version of a
team's emblem would identify that emblem as being affiliated with the team.
In fact, if customers thought that the emblem was a replica and could
determine that the emblem was different than the trademarked emblem,
customers might forego purchasing the product with the copied emblem.
Consequently, in a sense, customers would be confused.
Although this is the end of the analysis for the court, there is more to the
issue. Specifically, the situations in Boston Professional Hockey and in the
above hypothetical are not the precise types of situations that trademark law
seeks to enjoin. Trademark protection exists principally for the benefit of the
consumer, not for the benefit of the trademark owner. 10 8 While the trademark
owner certainly derives many benefits by building up goodwill that becomes
associated with the trademark in the minds of consumers, these benefits are
secondary in terms of the goals of trademark law.
Thus, the question becomes whether Dallas Cap and other manufacturers
of unauthorized sports logos have misappropriated the goodwill of
professional sports teams. There are several reasons why such alleged
defendants should not be liable for trademark infringement.
First, the emblem suggests nothing about the quality of the underlying
product. Professional sports teams license their logos for use on products of
varying quality levels. For instance, with baseball caps, a customer can
purchase a cheap, adjustable mesh cap or a fitted, wool cap. The caps have
two things in common: they feature the team logo, and the team has licensed
both caps. However, that is where the similarities end as the wool cap is of a
much higher quality than the mesh cap.
Second, although the emblem includes a trademark, it is not functioning in
a typical trademark way, at least in the minds of consumers. Consumers see
the trademark and in consumers' minds, the trademark does not correlate with
a certain quality level. Rather, consumers who choose to purchase goods that
feature the trademark do so because of the trademark itself. That is,
consumers want a piece of apparel with the trademark because of the message
the trademark conveys to the public as opposed to the quality level suggested
107. Id.
108. See Part II.A, supra.
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by the trademark. Thus, the situation in Boston Professional Hockey can be
distinguished from situations involving the use of a logo in the trademark
sense. For example, if a manufacturer of baseball equipment were to produce
baseball gloves with a counterfeit "Rawlings" logo, Rawlings would properly
have a claim of trademark infringement because consumers purchase the
Rawlings glove because Rawlings is known to make quality equipment.
Third, because the trademark does not signify a certain quality level, the
trademark does not serve the typical function of reducing research costs for
consumers. Because there are products of many different quality levels that
feature the trademark, consumers will still have to "read the label" to try to
determine whether a given product is made well.
The court in Boston Professional Hockey suggests that manufacturers such
as Dallas Cap should be enjoined because the trademark implies that the
underlying product has been in the control of the league or the team. 109
Certainly, it is possible that in some consumers' minds, there may be a
perception of sponsorship. However, there is no evidence that consumers'
decisions are influenced by the sponsorship or lack thereof. Even if customers
assume that merchandise is officially licensed, there is nothing to indicate that
customers assume that there is a certain quality level that is assured by the
sponsorship. In addition, because the presence or absence of sponsorship does
not suggest anything about the quality of the underlying product, the
sponsorship is not relevant for the purposes of trademark law.
Finally, as discussed above, trademark law exists for the benefit of
consumers.110 Trademark law spills into the tort of misappropriation of
goodwill only to the extent that an infringer deceives consumers to their
detriment. Here, while there is arguably deception of consumers, it is not the
type of deception that trademark law seeks to prevent. Moreover, the infringer
is not "destroying the buyer's opportunity to judge fairly between rival
commodities by introducing.., factors.., which are capable of misinforming
as to the true qualities of the competitive products" as was discussed in Gold
Seal Co. v. Weeks. 1I1
As the preceding discussion alludes to, a major problem with the court's
decision is that the defendant's behavior in Boston Professional Hockey did
not result in consumers associating lesser quality with the plaintiffs'
trademarks. Thus, a seemingly analogous issue would be presented if a soft
drink manufacturer produced a soft drink of the same quality level and taste as
Coca-Cola and attached a counterfeit Coca-Cola logo to his cans of soda.
109. Boston Profl Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1012.
110. See Part IB, supra.
111. 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955).
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However, a court would not be wrong to find such a counterfeit manufacturer
guilty of trademark infringement.
From the perspective of the sports leagues and Coca-Cola, the apparel
manufacturers in Boston Professional Hockey and the soda producers in the
Coca-Cola hypothetical have acted identically. However, from the perspective
of consumers, the apparel manufacturers are very different from the
counterfeit Coca-Cola producers, and it is this difference in consumer
perceptions that is key. Specifically, purchasers of the sports merchandise buy
the merchandise for the logo and do not necessarily consider the quality of the
underlying goods. Moreover, even if they do consider whether the underlying
goods are of a decent quality, the logo does nothing to indicate what that
quality level is.
In contrast, purchasers of Coca-Cola rely on the trademark to indicate that
the underlying product is of a certain quality level. The fact that the
counterfeit soda is of the same quality is of little relevance. The reason for
this is that under trademark law, consumers know that a trademark indicates a
single source for the underlying goods. Again, what makes the counterfeit
Coca-Cola manufacturer's behavior unacceptable from a trademark law
perspective is that the trademark is being used as a source identifier. With
sports logos, consumers do not purchase the underlying merchandise based on
the trademark connotations of the logo; rather, they purchase the underlying
apparel so that they can have a piece of merchandise that features the desired
logo.
Furthermore, a sports team should not be able to sustain a trademark
action based on "post-sale confusion." Post-sale confusion concerns what
non-purchasing consumers think when they see other consumers wearing
merchandise that features counterfeit logos. 112  Even if the purchasing
consumers understand that the merchandise is counterfeit, these non-
purchasing consumers would not be aware. For example, if a customer went
to a street vendor and purchased a Louis Vuitton imitation handbag that cannot
be easily distinguished from genuine Louis Vuitton products, non-purchasing
consumers on the street would probably assume that the imitation bag was
actually produced by Louis Vuitton. If the handbag then quickly deteriorated,
although the purchaser would not have a negative association with Louis
Vuitton, these non-purchasing consumers who see the shoddily made product
112. Post-sale confusion is a somewhat controversial doctrine because it does not involve the
actual purchasing consumers. As a result, the harm is much less clear. The details and merits of the
doctrine are beyond the scope of this Note. However, for a more extensive discussion of the doctrine,
see, e.g., David M. Tichane, The Maturing Trademark Doctrine of Post-Sales Confusion, 85
TRADEMARK REP. 399 (1995).
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might then incorrectly associate Louis Vuitton with poor quality products. In
such a scenario, Louis Vuitton might be able to claim trademark infringement
based on this post-sale confusion. 113
Although post-sale confusion might assist Louis Vuitton and similarly
situated trademark owners, it would not help sports team trademark owners.
Specifically, even if the counterfeit sports logo products fell apart, the
trademark still would not be serving as a source indicator. In addition, the
logo would not be performing a quality assurance function. Finally, while it is
reasonable to assume that non-purchasing consumers would have a negative
association with Louis Vuitton in the scenario outlined above, there is nothing
to indicate that non-purchasing consumers would negatively associate sports
team trademarks with poor quality in the situation described in Boston
Professional Hockey.
b. Aesthetic Functionality
Although Boston Professional Hockey was decided by the Fifth Circuit,
the court focused its analysis with respect to aesthetic functionality on
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 114 a Ninth Circuit decision. In Boston
Professional Hockey, the court distinguished the situation in Pagliero from the
case at bar and held that Dallas Cap could not avail itself of the aesthetic
functionality defense. 115 Therefore, it is worth considering first whether the
court's decision comports with the Ninth Circuit's test for aesthetic
functionality.
In Pagliero, admittedly, the situation was different. Specifically, the
defendant in Pagliero had duplicated the design characteristics of the china
that the plaintiff was attempting to sell. 116 Thus, the defendant had not copied
a trademarked logo. Rather, the defendant had copied design characteristics
for which the plaintiff claimed protection. 117 The court outlined the test for
aesthetic functionality as follows:
But, where the features are "functional" there is normally no right to
113. See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:7. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that a retailer
of counterfeit Louis Vuitton and Gucci merchandise was liable for trademark infringement without
ever considering the question of post-sale confusion. See Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Lee, 875 F.2d 564
(7th Cir. 1989). However, that case differs from the Louis Vuitton hypothetical presented here in that
the defendants in that case were attempting to pass off the counterfeit merchandise as genuine Louis
Vuitton and Gucci products.
114. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
115. Boston Prof'l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1013.
116. Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 342.
117. Id.
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relief. "Functional" in this sense might be said to connote other than a
trade-mark purpose. If the particular feature is an important ingredient
in the commercial success of the product, the interest in free
competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent or
copyright. On the other hand, where the feature or, more aptly,
design, is a mere arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the
goods primarily adopted for purposes of identification and
individuality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands in
connection with the product, imitation may be forbidden .... 118
Because the court determined that the design was an important element in the
selling of the china, the court held that the design features were functional and,
therefore, not protectable under trademark law.' 1 9
The court in Boston Professional Hockey noted that "' [t]he attractiveness
and eye-appeal of the design sells the china,' not the trademark character of
the designs."' 120 Thus, the court implicitly distinguished the two cases based
on the fact that the logos operated as trademarks apart from their inclusion on
merchandise.
However, the language of Pagliero does not support the distinction made
by the court in Boston Professional Hockey. Just as in Pagliero, the designs in
Boston Professional Hockey were "not merely indicia of source." 121 While the
counterfeit logos used by Dallas Cap may be trademarks, they do not function
as trademarks when used on merchandise. Moreover, it is precisely the
inclusion of the logos that causes consumers to want to purchase the
underlying merchandise. Thus, under the language of Pagliero, granting
trademark protection in such circumstances thwarts open competition and the
success of the free market.
Even if the court was correct in rejecting Dallas Cap's aesthetic
functionality defense, trademark law has evolved over the quarter century
since Dallas Cap was decided such that the defense is now more defined. In
fact, in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,122 the Supreme Court
discussed the defense in an important trademark case that was decided in
1995.
One of the arguments that the Court considered was whether a defendant
118. Id. at 343 (citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. Boston Profil Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1013 (quoting Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343-44) (citations
omitted).
121. Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 344.
122. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
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could claim that a color is functional and therefore not subject to protection. 123
In the most telling quote regarding functionality from the decision, the Court
stated that "[t]he functionality doctrine thus protects competitors against a
disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that trademark protection
might otherwise impose, namely, their inability reasonably to replicate
important non-reputation-related product features."' 124 In addition, the Court
cited the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition for the proposition that
"if a design's 'aesthetic value' lies in its ability to 'confer a significant benefit
that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of alternative designs,' then the
design is 'functional."' 125"For example, this Court has written that
competitors might be free to copy the color of a medical pill where that color
serves to identify the kind of medication (e.g., a type of blood medicine) in
addition to its source." 126 Thus, aesthetic functionality protects a counterfeit
user if the user is not using the mark in a source-identifying manner or as an
indicia of a certain quality level.
The Supreme Court's dicta notwithstanding, the question is whether it
makes sense to permit defendants such as Dallas Cap to invoke the aesthetic
functionality defense. Allowing the defense in such circumstances may not
comport with notions of fair play because it enables defendants such as Dallas
Cap to take advantage of the work the professional sports teams have
undertaken to make the teams and the associated merchandise popular. Thus,
defendants such as Dallas Cap can free-ride on sports teams by letting the
teams invest money developing and publicizing their names and logos and
then step in and sell competing, counterfeit merchandise. However, such
behavior is not trademark law's concern. As discussed above, trademark law
protects marks to the extent that they identify the manufacturers of the
underlying products and connote a certain quality level. Functionality exists
as a defense so that trademark owners cannot gain a competitive advantage
based on the functional features of their trademarks. 127
Without an aesthetic functionality defense, there would be (is) a single
manufacturer of merchandise featuring logos of professional sports teams,
resulting in a marketplace without competitive balance. 128  In those
123. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 168-69.
124. Id. at 169.
125. Id. at 170.
126. Id. at 169.
127. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 7:63.
128. The purpose of the discussion here is to explain how the aesthetic functionality defense may
limit monopolistic behavior. Sports, in general, present many complicated antitrust issues. For
example, typically, there is only one manufacturer of professional baseball in a given city. However,
to determine whether the baseball team has a monopoly involves determining what the relevant
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circumstances, the trademark owners can set prices much higher without
affecting demand significantly because rabid fans of a given team will still
want the merchandise featuring the team logo. The effect can be seen in the
related area of concert memorabilia. If you go to a rock concert, there may be
"bootleg" merchandise that is legally available for purchase outside the
stadium. However, inside the stadium, the promoter has a monopoly on the
officially licensed merchandise. As such, the promoter can charge twenty
dollars for a tee shirt that would probably sell for ten dollars in a truly
competitive market.
B. Federal Dilution Law Does Not Provide a Bar to Counterfeit Logo
Manufacturers. 129
Twenty-one years after Boston Professional Hockey was decided,
Congress amended the Lanham Act to provide for a trademark cause of action
under the theory of dilution. 130 Consequently, it is worth considering whether
professional sports teams could sustain a trademark cause of action based on
dilution. As discussed in Part II.B.2.b, dilution typically occurs when the
defendant's actions either blur or tarnish the trademark owner's mark. Here,
because there are no negative connotations to the consumer as a result of the
counterfeit logo manufacturers' actions, tarnishment is inapplicable.
Additionally, dilution as a result of blurring ultimately does not apply
either, but it is necessary to explore the theory more to explain why. In Mead
Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,131 the Second Circuit
entered into an extensive discussion regarding dilution. Although Mead Data
Central was decided under New York's anti-dilution statute and was prior to
the enactment of the federal statute, the Second Circuit's dilution analysis is
pertinent.
Mead Data Central was a dispute where the owners of the trademark for
LEXIS, the online legal research service, claimed that the LEXIS trademark
was diluted by Toyota's use of LEXUS to signify its line of luxury cars. 132
market is. For example, the relevant market may be just baseball, all sports, or all recreational
activities. Furthermore, the geographic region of the relevant market would have to be determined.
The relationship between antitrust and sports is beyond the scope of this paper.
129. Many states have dilution laws. For an analysis of how the California dilution law would
apply to situations involving sports logos, see Friedman, supra note 84, at 704-11. Notably,
Friedman's Comment predated the passage of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act and does not
analyze the applicability of federal dilution law to such scenarios.
130. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)).
131. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989).
132. MeadData, 875 F.2d at 1026.
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The court found that there was no dilution by blurring because LEXIS lacked
the necessary distinctive quality in the minds of the general public. 133 Thus,
the court noted that the dilution cause of action exists to prevent "the whittling
away of an established trademark's selling power and value through its
unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products."' 134 As such, dilution
extends protection to trademark owners into areas where such owners could
not claim a likelihood of confusion. Thus, on its face, dilution by blurring
would seem inapplicable to situations where a manufacturer has created
counterfeit sports logos because the counterfeit logo merchandiser and the
trademark owner are using the logo on related products.
In addition, the underlying theory of the federal dilution statute is to
ensure that the owner of a famous trademark can maintain the distinctiveness
of that trademark.135  As with traditional trademark infringement,
distinctiveness refers to the ability of the mark to perform its trademark
function, that is, to identify the source of the product on which the mark
appears. Again, because sports logos on merchandise do not suggest anything
about the quality of the merchandise and do not connote a single source in the
minds of consumers, manufacturers of counterfeit logos do not affect the
distinctiveness of the trademarked logos.
The inapplicability of dilution to the situations discussed in the
hypothetical and in Boston Professional Hockey raises the question of whether
a trademark-owning sports team could raise a dilution claim if it did not
produce any merchandise with its logo affixed. Under such circumstances, at
first glance, a counterfeit logo manufacturer such as Dallas Cap might be
liable based on a dilution by blurring theory. This would seem to be an odd
result: A team could only win a trademark infringement suit unless it was not
producing competing products. However, this result would not come about
because the logo would still not be performing a source-identifying function in
the latter scenario. That is, in the scenario in which the team does not produce
merchandise with the logo affixed, the counterfeit manufacturer's goods do
not change: they still have the logo, but the logo is not being used to identify
source or quality in the minds of consumers.
133. Id. at 1031-32.
134. Id. at 1031.
135. See GILSON, supra note 18, § 5.12[1][a].
[Vol. 14:2
PATCHING OVER A PERCEIVED HOLE...
C. Solutions
1. State Law Unfair Competition May Apply to Counterfeit Logo
Manufacturers in Some Circumstances
Assuming that a rightful trademark owner cannot sustain a cause of action
under federal trademark law, the trademark owner is still protected from
counterfeit logo manufacturers, specifically by state unfair competition laws.
As an initial matter, although a couple of early cases held that Congress
preempted states from applying laws to the entire field of trademarks, 136 those
cases are not considered to be a valid interpretation of the preemption doctrine
with respect to trademark law. 137 In fact, explicit references in the Lanham
Act indicate that Congress contemplated an ongoing body of state law on the
subject.'38 Regardless, even if Congress intended to preempt state trademark
laws, that would not preclude states from enforcing unfair competition laws
that are consistent with the Lanham Act.
In the area of unfair competition, most states have enacted some form of
the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which was
originally promulgated by the FTC in 1967.139 The state implementations
vary from the broadly worded prohibitions against unfair and deceptive
practices as in New York140 and Florida 41 to the precise language of the
Texas statute that enumerates specifically prohibited types of conduct. 142
136. See Sargent & Co. v. Welco Feed Mfg. Co., 195 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1952); Time, Inc. v.
T.I.M.E. Inc., 123 F. Supp. 446 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
137. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 825.
138. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b)(5) (2000)).
139. See PATTISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, at 540-41.
140. The New York statute provides: "Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business,
trade, or commerce ... are hereby declared unlawful." N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (Consol. 1999).
141. The Florida statute is worded as follows: "Unfair methods of competition ... and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (1999).
142. The Texas statute lists the following thirteen types of behavior as being prohibited as unfair
competition:
(1) passing off goods or services as those of another;
(2) causing [likelihood of] confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval, or
certification of goods or services;
(3) causing [likelihood of] confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation, connection, or association
with, or certification by another;
(4) using deceptive representations or designation of geographic origin in connection with goods or
services;
(5) representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses,
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Under the Florida statute, a professional sports team could make a strong
argument that defendants such as Dallas Cap are acting unfairly by
manufacturing and selling unlicensed, counterfeit logos. Meanwhile, under
the Texas statute, a professional sports team could make plausible arguments
that Dallas Cap's behavior is prohibited by several clauses of the statute. For
instance, under the fifth clause, a team could argue that Dallas Cap's behavior
represents to the public that Dallas Cap's merchandise is sponsored or
approved by the NHL or the underlying teams. While the Lanham Act
requires that a trademark be indicative of a certain quality level to function as
a trademark, the Texas unfair competition statute has no such requirement.
However, under the New York statute, a professional sports team may
have a harder time sustaining a claim of unfair competition. Specifically, the
New York statute requires that the plaintiff prove that the defendant engaged
in fraudulent, misleading or deceptive practices rather than merely unfair
practices. Consequently, while Dallas Cap's behavior was unfair to the sports
teams, it would be much harder to prove that the behavior was fraudulent,
misleading or deceptive.
Obviously, if a professional sports team can successfully mount unfair
competition claims in some states but not others, the results are not ideal,
especially from the perspective of the teams. Teams would like to stop all
manufacturing of counterfeit logos, but if state unfair competition laws are the
only viable causes of action, prohibiting such business practices in states like
New York will be nearly impossible.
benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status,
affiliation, or connection which he does not [have];
(6) representing that goods are original or new if they are deteriorated, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or
secondhand;
(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a
particular style or model, if they are of another;
(8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or misleading representation of facts;
(9) advertising goods or service with intent not to sell them as advertised;
(10) advertising goods or services with intent not to supply a reasonable[,] expectable public demand,
unless the advertisements disclosed a limitation on quantity;
(11) making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of
price reductions;
(12) representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not
have or involve or which are prohibited by law; or
(13) knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the need for parts, replacement,
or repair services.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 2002).
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2. Copyright Law May Provide a Limited Purpose Solution for Some
Trademark Owners
Even if a trademark owner cannot successfully make a claim of trademark
infringement, the trademark owner may be able to sustain a cause of action
against counterfeit logo manufacturers based on copyright infringement. Like
trademarks, copyrights fall under the general category of intellectual property.
However, that is where the similarities end. While trademark law exists for
the protection of consumers, copyright law exists to provide incentives for
people to create new works of art, music, literature, and other expressive
works. 143
As such, a question of copyright infringement focuses on comparing the
allegedly infringing copy to the original work and determining what the
alleged infringer did to create the copy. 144 More specifically, for a sports logo
manufacturer to sustain a copyright infringement claim, he would have to
prove that his logo is original and therefore copyrightable subject matter. 145
Most sports logos would constitute original works of art in all likelihood.
However, while copyright law probably would enable a sports team such as
the Cleveland Indians to prevent a counterfeit manufacturer from creating a tee
shirt using the Indians' stylized logo, it probably would not allow the Indians
to sustain a claim against a manufacturer who produced a shirt that merely
contained the words "Cleveland Indians." Consequently, copyright law would
provide relief for sports teams only for certain types of infringement.
Assuming that the sports team has copyrightable subject matter, the team
would have to prove that the counterfeit manufacturer actually copied the logo
or that the counterfeit manufacturer had access to the original and the
counterfeit was substantially similar to the original. 146 However, the team
should be able to cross that hurdle relatively easily because it is extremely
unlikely that a counterfeit manufacturer could successfully claim that he
developed the Cleveland Indians logo independently and that it just happens to
be identical to the genuine Indians logo.
143. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 325.
144. The focus of this Note is on how trademark law does not cover certain uses of sports logos
and is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of the various causes of action that the owners of
sports logos may employ to protect their rights. Therefore, a thorough discussion of copyright law is
beyond the scope of this Note.
145. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
146. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946).
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3. Amending the Lanham Act to Recognize a Misappropriation Cause of
Action Is Not a Viable Solution
Because the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis and the dilution
analysis should permit defendants such as Dallas Cap to escape liability and
because unfair competition laws vary in significant ways from state to state, a
proposed solution would be to amend the Lanham Act to assign liability in
such circumstances. In fact, in 1991, Marlene B. Hanson and W. Casey Walls
published an article in which they proposed just such a solution. 147
Hanson and Walls proposed amending § 32 of the Lanham Act to include
the following language:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant
(c) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, colorable
imitation of, or mark similar to, a registered mark in such a way as to
unjustly appropriate the registered mark's trademark good will,...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided. 148
Alternatively, Hanson and Walls suggested amending § 43 by adding the
following subsection:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant, use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, colorable imitation of,
or mark similar to, a registered mark in such a way as to unjustly
appropriate the registered mark's trademark good will.... shall be
liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies provided in
this act. 149
If the two amendments were adopted, professional sports team plaintiffs
would have a much more legitimate claim that defendants such as Dallas Cap
were liable for trademark infringement. Specifically, since both suggested
amendments focus on unjust enrichment and cast aside likelihood of
confusion, counterfeit sports logo manufacturers would seem to fit neatly into
the language of the advocated amendments.
Arguably, however, the amendments would not assign liability to
defendants such as Dallas Cap. Although both amendments assign liability
based on unjust enrichment, they also require an appropriation of goodwill.
To the extent that the emblems do not carry any goodwill in the trademark
147. Marlene B. Hanson & W. Casey Walls, Protecting Trademark Good Will: The Case for a
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sense, these amendments would be inapplicable.
However, assuming that the language of the amendments could be altered
such that the behavior of Dallas Cap and other counterfeit logo manufacturers
is definitely prohibited, the amendments would have undesirable effects.
Specifically, by amending the Lanham Act as suggested, the landscape of
trademark law would be significantly altered such that the focus was shifted
from the effects on consumers to the effects on the trademark owners.
While implementing a federal misappropriation law or a broad unfair
competition law is arguably a good idea, doing so under the guise of
trademark law would have untoward effects. By explicitly creating a
trademark misappropriation cause of action, Congress would require courts to
examine how a defendant's actions have caused monetary harm to the
trademark owner without regard to whether or not consumers are affected.
Thus, Congress would convert trademark ownership into a property right.
While patent, copyright, and trade secret laws are all property rights,
trademarks, at least traditionally, have not been protected as property rights.
Rather, trademark rights have existed only to the extent that the trademarks
distinguish goods in the minds of consumers.
If other areas of intellectual property are protected as property rights, a
valid question is why not convert trademark rights to property rights.
However, trademarks are fundamentally different from copyrights, patents,
and trade secrets. While those areas of intellectual property are protected to
encourage invention and creativity, the theory underlying trademark law has
nothing to do with creativity.150 As discussed previously, trademarks exist to
allow consumers to distinguish between similar goods without investing an
extensive amount of time or money.
Moreover, by amending the Lanham Act as suggested, the defenses of
functionality and aesthetic functionality for trade dress and product
configuration would be largely eliminated. Eliminating the functionality
defenses would have dangerous effects including granting patent-like
protection to trademarks and trade dress that would otherwise not be eligible
for patents. Unlike trademarks, which last as long as the marks remain
distinctive, patents grant the inventor an exclusive monopoly for the life of the
patent, approximately twenty years. 151 If a defendant could not invoke a
functionality defense, the trademark owner would be able to preclude
competitors from entering the field, at least until competitors could develop
alternatives. While this would arguably encourage better inventions, that is
150. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 530.
151. See MERGES ETAL., supra note 8, at 114.
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not the goal of trademark law. 152 Rather, that is the goal of patent law. 153
Moreover, with patents, the invention eventually falls into the public domain.
However, without a functionality defense, functional trademarks would never
enter the public domain, and competition would be significantly hampered.
4. The Solution is for Courts to Correctly Apply Federal Trademark Law 154
Given the problems that adding an unjust enrichment cause of action to the
Lanham Act would create, the question becomes how can professional sports
teams prevent unlicensed manufacturers such as Dallas Cap from creating
counterfeit logos. The answer to this question is that the teams should be able
to avail themselves only of state unfair competition laws as long as the team
logos are not functioning as trademarks.
As discussed above, forcing teams to rely on state unfair competition laws
will yield uneven results; while teams will be able to enjoin counterfeit logo
manufacturers in some states, teams may fail to sustain a cause of action in
other states. However, this anomaly does not mean that trademark law should
step in just to create uniformity. Trademark law is a subset of the larger body
of unfair competition, and it was not intended to create an all-inclusive body
of federal unfair competition law.
Arguably, protecting teams from manufacturers such as Dallas Cap
encourages investment by the teams in the logos. However, that argument
ignores the unique nature of sports logos. Specifically, sports teams had logos
well before merchandising became such a big business. Therefore, although
merchandising is undoubtedly a major revenue source now, the fact that these
logos have existed for so long indicates that the merchandising of the logos is
of secondary importance as to the existence of the logos. In addition, the
sports logos do not have goodwill in the trademark sense, at least as related to
merchandise. Thus, the traditional rationale for trademark law of encouraging
investment in a trademark as a signal of quality merchandise is inapplicable.
Ultimately, the goals of trademark law are not advanced by using it to
punish the behavior of manufacturers such as Dallas Cap. Although teams
may suffer losses of revenue if they are unable to stop such manufacturers,
nothing indicates that the losses will reduce the trademark capacities of the
logos. Where teams use the logos to indicate that they are the sources of
quality products, the logos will continue to function in the trademark sense.
152. See supra Part II.A.
153. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 8, at 119.
154. For a thorough discussion of how courts have strayed from the traditional likelihood of
confusion analysis and recognized a property interest in trademarks, see Lemley, supra note 7.
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For instance, when a team prints tickets for its home games, the use of the
trademark on the ticket indicates a certain quality level that consumers can
expect when they attend the games. Thus, teams could still sustain a
trademark cause of action (among others) against people who print counterfeit
tickets. 155
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts have periodically used trademark law to enjoin manufacturers from
producing counterfeit sports logos. However, while the behavior of these
manufacturers is questionable at best, it is not the place of trademark law to
stop such behavior. Sports logos on merchandise do not indicate a certain
quality level to consumers. Therefore, the logos are not operating as
trademarks. To prohibit such behavior under existing federal trademark law is
to misapply the law. To alter federal trademark law such that the behavior is
explicitly prohibited would fundamentally change the focus of trademark law
in an undesirable way. Therefore, protecting professional sports teams from
counterfeit logo manufacturers is best done through other bodies of law.
Admittedly, most courts are likely to follow the reasoning of the court in
Boston Professional Hockey by rejecting the functionality defense and finding
that defendants similar to Dallas Cap are liable for trademark infringement.
Perhaps a more realistic possibility is that courts will follow the reasoning that
a district court in California did in Plasticolor Molded Products v. Ford Motor
Co.156 in 1989. There, the court determined that the use of Ford's trademark
car name Mustang by a third-party manufacturer of floor mats constituted a
mixed-use in which using the logo constituted a functional use in part and a
trademark use in part. 157 Although the decision was ultimately vacated
pursuant to a settlement, the court's proposed remedy was to require a
disclaimer of affiliation by the third-party at the point-of-sale. 158 Requiring
defendants such as Dallas Cap to disclaim affiliation with the NHL or any of
its teams would be a workable compromise that does not offend trademark
law.
155. However, teams probably could not sustain a trademark cause of action against defendants
who produce counterfeit tickets for sale as souvenirs after the games have been played.
156. 713 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
157. 1d.
158. See PATTISHALL ET AL., supra note 3, at 393.
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